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Este trabajo presenta evidencia sobre la relación entre la movilidad laboral y la salarial 
para varios países europeos usando el Panel de Hogares Europeo (1994-2001). Mientras 
gran parte de la investigación previa se centra en el uso de regresiones mínimo 
cuadráticas para predecir salarios de individuos con diferentes experiencias laborales, 
nosotros encontramos que es importante considerar la posible selección no aleatoria 
entre los trabajadores que cambian de empleo y los que continúan en el mismo empleo 
así como entre los que se mueven de manera voluntaria o involuntaria. Por ello 
estimamos un modelo de regresiones alternantes multinomial con selección endógena y 
compuesto de dos ecuaciones de selección y tres ecuaciones salariales. Nuestros 
resultados indican que la movilidad a través del desempleo tiene un rendimiento negativo 
para todas las economías analizadas. En comparación con los cambios salariales de los 
trabajadores que no cambian de empleo, estas pérdidas van desde un 5% en Portugal a 
un 22% en Alemania. 
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This paper presents evidence on the relationship between job mobility and wage mobility 
for some European countries using the European Community Household Panel (1994-
2001). While much of the earlier research uses least-squares regression to predict wages 
for individuals with different work experience, we find that it is important to take account 
of possible non-random selection   between job movers and job stayers and between 
voluntary and involuntary movers. In this paper we focus on the effects of a spell of 
unemployment on subsequent wages by estimating a multinomial endogenous switching 
model composed of two selection equations and three wage equations. Our results 
indicate that job mobility through unemployment has negative returns in all the analysed 
economies. Relative to stayers, these losses range from 5% in Portugal to 22% in 
Germany. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A great deal of attention has been paid to the relationship between job mobility and wage 
mobility as it is not clear what the effect is of different work experience on individual wages 
and their relative position in the wage distribution. Firstly, to study individual wage behaviour it 
is important to distinguish between job movers and job stayers because, given on the wage 
setting mechanism, both groups may experience very different earning dynamics. But then a 
second issue arises as job change can take place for different reasons and workers may 
experience job changes
1 with and without an intermediate spell of unemployment. In this paper 
we relate voluntary job separations with job-to-job transitions and involuntary job changes 
when the worker experiences a spell of unemployment. Obviously, one would expect to observe 
different wage patterns depending on the type of job separation.  
This paper can be related to two different branches of empirical studies. Some previous studies 
examine job mobility in order to test different hypothesis related to human capital models, 
search models and matching models. Another branch of the literature is eminently empirical and 
studies the returns or costs resulting from job mobility focusing on workers who have 
experienced a spell of unemployment. This previous literature has shown that there can be 
important differences in wage variations depending on the type of separation from the previous 
job. For instance, some studies show that in the United States involuntary job separation leads to 
wage losses between 10% and 20%. Furthermore, in some cases these real wage losses may 
become permanent future rent losses (Kletzer, 1996; Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan, 1993; 
Stevens 1997; Seninger, 1997). On the contrary, the common finding in those studies focused 
on the impact on wages of job mobility without an intermediate period of unemployment is that 
job mobility in this case leads to wage gains that range between 10% and 20% (Keith and 
McWilliams, 1997; Mincer, 1993).  
It is worth noting that many empirical papers do not explicitly take into account the 
unobservable differences between movers and stayers and only a few earlier studies refer to the 
analysis of wage gains and their relation to job mobility considering this self-selection problem 
(Antel, 1986; Topel, 1991; Mincer, 1993; Bartel and Rojas, 1981; Holmlund, 1991). However, 
with the exception of Antel (1986) these studies do not distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary job separations when computing average mobility returns or job turnover. Some 
studies that focus on the effect of unemployment on re-employment wages try to overcome the 
self-selection problem by restricting the sample of unemployed workers to displaced workers
2 
(Rhum, 1991; Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Stevens, 1997; Carneiro and Portugal, 
2003). Nevertheless, even in this case the issue of selectivity bias merits some attention. The 
problem arises when workers, who know in advance that the firm will close or will make some 
employment re-structuring, are more likely to take action to avoid unemployment and get 
alternative employment in time. Those who are successful will presumably have more valuable 
skills and will suffer smaller wage losses as a result of job change than those who pass through 
the state of unemployment. On the other hand, the majority of papers interested in the effect of 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, job change is synonymous with employer change since we can not distinguish between job 
positions within firms and other types of internal labour mobility experiences.  
2 Displacement can be defined as an involuntary separation of workers from their jobs due to exogenous reasons, 
mainly firm downsizing and closing. 
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unemployment on re-employment wages, given the characteristics of their database, cannot 
identify the cause of unemployment and therefore their results suffer from a selection bias.   
Existing research has focused on the US case but evidence for European countries is still 
relatively sparse. Recently, some papers have investigated whether comparable costs to 
involuntary job mobility exist in the European labour markets (Saint Paul and Rosolia, 1998; 
Burda and Mertens, 2001; Carneiro and Portugal, 2003; Lefranc, 2003). In Lefranc (2003) wage 
losses are compared among individuals from France and the US and, although the 
unemployment rate in France is clearly superior, the quantity of re-employment wage losses are 
slightly superior in the US. Saint Paul and Rosolia (1998) study wage losses in Spain to test if 
high Spanish unemployment is related to real wage rigidity. They conclude that although the 
unemployment rate is superior in Spain, the estimated wage losses are significantly superior to 
those obtained in other countries with lower unemployment rates such as France, Germany and 
the US. However, available evidence is not comparable among European countries due to 
differences in the econometric specification and in the type of the data used. Hence, whether 
these returns or costs to job mobility in Europe are important remains an open question.  
This paper attempts to offer new empirical evidence on the relationship between job mobility 
and wage mobility trying to overcome some shortcomings found in previous literature. To 
accomplish this aim we propose to estimate a multinomial endogenous switching model. Using 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, 1994-2001) we study the cases of Spain, 
Germany, Portugal and France. 
Henceforth, one novel feature of the present study lies in the econometric approach chosen. We 
specify a multinomial switching regression model, which allows us to jointly estimate a 
trivariate selection process that accounts for the type of transition and three wage equations that 
explain wage behaviour conditional on each type of transition. The fundamental econometric 
problem arising in this type of study is due to the fact that the earnings of each individual are 
only observed in one state, either as an involuntary job mover, voluntary job mover or as a 
stayer. In this framework, it is possible that each group is a non-random sample of workers and 
the process that explains the type of transition they have can be correlated with observed and 
unobserved characteristics of the individual. This inconsistency problem is overcome by 
estimating separate earnings equations for stayers, voluntary and involuntary movers with the 
appropriate corrections. These estimates are then used to predict a worker’s earnings in the three 
potential labour states. By comparing potential wages in each state, we are able to measure the 
returns of job mobility and the costs of having a spell of unemployment compared to staying at 
the job or compared to having a job-to-job transition. 
The study of wage mobility and its relation to job mobility is interesting for different reasons. 
Firstly, from a theoretical perspective it may help to describe the labour market dynamics and 
wage setting mechanisms of the analysed countries. Wage losses after a spell of unemployment 
may be seen as an adjustment mechanism of the labour market and from this point of view wage 
losses can be an indicator of real wage rigidity. That is, if there is no wage rigidity, workers in 
countries with high rates of unemployment should experience larger wage losses after a spell of 
unemployment. Secondly, from a different perspective, the distinction between different 
patterns of wage mobility is also relevant in the context of wage inequality and its relation with 
unemployment. In this framework, earnings instability may be related to job instability 
especially when, for different reasons, current wage losses become permanent changes of the 
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worker´s position on the wage distribution.  For instance, workers who enter into unstable jobs 
also tend to have repeated spells of unemployment and therefore they will experience permanent 
wage losses as each spell of unemployment cause a wage loss that add up to the previous one.   
In this paper we address the following questions: first, what are the losses caused by having a 
spell of unemployment. Second, are these wage losses permanent? And third, do these losses 
depend on the type of job change? Moreover, while looking at the effects of involuntary job 
mobility on wages we investigate the need to control by non-random selection or unobserved 
heterogeneity in order to measure wage changes from job mobility. 
Overall, our results point to important differences in wage behaviour between different types of 
job movers and show that without considering the endogeneity problem we underestimate the 
wage penalties caused by a spell of unemployment relative to both voluntary job mobility and 
job stability. Other important conclusion of this paper is that job mobility may generate 
important returns but can also create costs for the worker. When job mobility is voluntary, job 
change can be the quickest way in which workers advance in their careers and move up in the 
wage structure. In other cases, however, job mobility implies relative costs for workers and 
these costs may have permanent effects on their future income. These costs arise mainly when 
job change implies an intermediate spell of unemployment and are much higher when we use 
voluntary job movers as the comparison group. Relative to stayers, these losses range from 5% 
in Portugal to 22% in Germany. Moreover, voluntary job mobility gives positive returns to the 
worker relative to involuntary job mobility and, more relevantly, relative to job stability. We 
have also found that high involuntary job mobility is positively associated with low wages and 
other spells of unemployment and this effect persists despite corrections for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the 
theoretical models that relate job mobility and wage mobility on one hand and involuntary job 
mobility and wage penalties on the other. Section 3 discusses the data while Section 4 outlines 
the methodology employed. Empirical results and diagnostics are reported in Section 5 while in 
Section 6 we present our main conclusions.  
2 THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND 
There exist several models analysing the determinants of job mobility and the subsequent effect 
of such mobility on the earnings of an individual over time. Basically, it is possible to 
distinguish three main theoretical approaches, the job search approach, the human capital 
approach and the job matching approach. These models usually describe the labour market as 
characterised by some degree of individual and job  heterogeneity or imperfect information.  
In Burdett (1978), there exists a distribution of productivity and wages, reflecting the worker’s 
different ability to perform tasks in each of the jobs available. The worker may be seen as 
entering the labour market with a stock of human capital, which remains constant over time, and 
firms differ in the level of productivity they can extract from the worker. Once employed, the 
individual is able to continuing searching. Each firm the worker approaches offers the wage that 
is related to his productivity within the firm. Some wage offers will be larger than the current 
wage and others will be lower than the wage currently earned. The more intensely the worker 
search, the higher is the arrival rate of wage offers. If the worker successfully identifies a job 
centrA:
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
A:  4
offering a higher wage, he will have an incentive to switch jobs - if the present value of the 
earnings stream in the alternative job exceeds the one associated with the current job, after 
allowing for any costs incurred when switching jobs. This simple search approach therefore 
predicts that mobility has a positive effect on lifetime earnings.  
If we allow this model to consider on-the-job training, worker’s productivity will not be 
constant while employed in a particular job. One of the main elements of the theory of human 
capital is that productivity increases with tenure on the job as a result of the accumulation of 
specific human capital. Rising productivity then gives the potential for on-the-job wage growth 
as the firm and the worker share the return generated by specific human capital investments. 
This is commonly observed in the positive association between wages and job tenure. In the 
version of the training approach considered by Mortensen (1988), an individual may be willing 
to accept a pay cut when switching jobs in order to receive a higher rate of wage growth in the 
new job. The idea is that when a worker switches jobs, the specific human capital accumulated 
at the previous one is lost because such firm specific skills are non-transferable and their 
contribution to the worker’s productivity is permanently lost when employment with the firm is 
finished. Thus, the worker remains with just his stock of general human capital to carry into the 
new job. Moreover, it is also often argued that unemployment results in the depreciation of 
general, transferable work skills, and that this depreciation may accelerate as the unemployment 
spell lengthens (Pissarides, 1992). These two aspects of the reduction in human capital resulting 
from unemployment both indicate lower worker productivity and therefore a lower wage on re-
employment.  
The assumptions of on-the-job search and on-the-job wage growth explain the positive relation 
between job mobility and wage mobility but they also help to explain changes in the reservation 
wage strategy of unemployed workers that imply real wage losses after a spell of 
unemployment. García-Pérez and Rebollo (2004) present a stationary job search model with on-
the-job search and on-the-job wage growth. Unemployed workers with high probabilities of 
getting high wage offers while employed will be willing to accept low wage offers in order to 
finish the spell of unemployment. Therefore, workers adjust their reservation wages and may 
incur wage losses in relation to their labour expectations.  In this model, high-wage workers 
may experience larger wage penalties after an unemployment spell. 
García-Pérez (2004) considers a non-stationary job search model and departs from the model of 
Van den Berg (1990) by introducing the possibility of firing. He finds a strong time-dependence 
on reservation wages. Lower reservation wages is the main determinant of the change in the 
hazard rate during the first four months of the spell of unemployment. After these months, 
acceptance probabilities move to one and the main determinant of the hazard is the job offer 
arrival rate. In this context, wage losses are related to the length of the spell of unemployment.  
Therefore, search and human capital models suggest that there are some characteristics that 
explain the job mobility behaviour of workers, such as labour market experience, search 
intensity, tenure, ability or productivity. If any of these characteristics are not observable then 
the predictions on wage return from job mobility will be biased. For instance, if high 
productivity workers have larger probabilities of getting offers from other firms, they will tend 
to have higher wages and to change jobs more frequently. If we compare the wage behaviour of 
this type of worker with a job stayer´s, which are less productive, then we will tend to 
overestimate the wage return from moving.  
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Furthermore, we know that low quality workers will tend to have larger probabilities of 
experiencing spells of unemployment and lower rates of wage growth on-the-job. Therefore, if 
we do not consider the unobserved heterogeneity between workers we could overestimate the 
wage penalty associated with the spell of unemployment.  
In the matching approach (Jovanovic, 1979) the most important assumption is that there may 
initially be uncertainty over a worker’s actual productivity within a particular job. As job tenure 
is accumulated, additional information is revealed related to the worker’s actual productivity on 
that job. Introducing these assumptions result in the implication that mis-matches may occur in 
the labour market where workers are initially not employed in the jobs in which they are most 
productive. Job mobility then provides the mechanism for the market to move towards an 
efficient allocation of resources where workers locate themselves in the jobs that maximise their 
productivity. Therefore, job match quality at a specific point in time partly depends on career 
decisions made by the individual up to the time of observation. At the same time, the 
individual’s career history signals to the employer the quality of previous and current matches. 
As match quality partly determines wages, the dependence of the match on past career decisions 
causes a potential endogeneity problem relevant for empirical analysis. Bad matches favour the 
probability of job mobility and simultaneously determine low tenure and low wages. If workers 
characterize job mobility with bad matches and the employer uses this information, job movers 
will have lower wages at the new job. If the workers who stay in the same jobs are the good 
matches and the ones who move are the bad matches, estimating the wage return from moving, 
using as a comparison group the stayers, will tend to underestimate the returns from job 
mobility. 
Job matching theory also helps to explain how unemployment experience will affect subsequent 
wages. According to this approach, a worker changes jobs and incurs an unemployment spell 
required for job search only to improve his position. Where a good match is achieved between a 
worker and a job, the resulting productivity is reflected in the wage. Good matches are durable, 
resulting in the observed correlation between wages and tenure. When an employment 
relationship is terminated, by either side, because of the poor quality of the match, future 
earnings will be enhanced if a better match is located. To the extent that unemployment allows 
for an improved sorting of workers among jobs, higher earnings may be expected. For instance, 
Topel and Ward (1992) and Loprest (1992) highlight the importance of job-to-job mobility for 
early career wage growth, estimating that job changes account for roughly one-third of the total 
wage growth during the first ten years in the market.   
A completely different scenario is suggested by Lazear (1986). He argues that rival firms may 
spot high wage productivity workers and compete for them. If this is the case, job mobility will 
be more common in good quality matches and therefore we will overestimate the return from 
job mobility. However, this scenario seems plausible only for a particular segment of the labour 
market.   
In line with the approach of imperfect information, some models (Lockwood, 1991; Blanchard 
and Diamond, 1994) are based on the fact that at the time of hiring a worker, the employer can 
only have a limited knowledge of that worker’s productivity and he will therefore look for 
signals that may convey information about this. It is possible that an employer will use an 
employee’s unemployment history as a negative signal (scarring hypothesis), and therefore he 
will offer lower wages to workers with a history of unemployment, at least initially. This type of 
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model establishes that unemployment experience has a significant effect on future labour market 
behaviour if unemployment occurs frequently.  The initial wage penalty should be eroded over a 
relatively short period if the new worker proves to be more productive than the employer 
initially inferred from his unemployment history. Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue that 
employers have an incentive to lay off poor quality matches. If an individual has been laid off, 
this could signal to a future employer that the employee was a poor quality match at the last job. 
Hence, a layoff could have a negative effect on subsequent wages. If job changers are adversely 
selected, that is, they belong to a group of poor matches, we could underestimate the effect of 
job change on wages.  
Obviously, none of these theoretical approaches is able to provide an exhaustive explanation of 
empirical evidence on modern labour markets. The basic conclusion for all of them, although 
each theoretical framework emphasizes some relevant issues, is that to estimate wage costs from 
involuntary job mobility it is necessary to pay attention to unobserved factors that may over or 
underestimate this cost. Summarizing, these models point to several mechanisms that can 
explain the fall in re-employment wages: the loss of specific human capital, the loss of a high 
quality match between the worker and the firm and the depreciation of specific and general 
workers´ skills for the duration of the employment.   
3 THE  DATA 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the European Community Household Panel. We 
use eight waves, from 1994 to 2001, for the following European countries: Spain, Germany, 
Portugal and France. This survey is the most appropriate for our objective because it offers 
homogeneous information for the different European countries considered in this paper. This 
allows us to directly compare the results obtained and to arrive at conclusions on the differences 
between the labour markets of the analysed economies.  
The ECHP is based on a survey that is annually carried out on a sample of households. It has a 
panel dimension so it allows us to follow the history of individuals during the life of the survey. 
Individuals' personal, labour and economic information is obtained together with some 
characteristics of the household. Most of the variables describe the individual's and household’s 
situation at the moment of the interview or refer to the current month of the interview. However, 
some variables related to individual and household annual earnings refer to the previous year.  
Another important characteristic is that the individual is requested to indicate labour earnings, 
among other income sources. 
Individual labour history is available through a retrospective report of monthly labour force 
status. The duration of the unemployment spell used in this paper is obtained from this monthly 
description of the labour situation of individuals. Moreover, we combine the monthly labour 
situation and the data on annual earnings to calculate monthly wages.
3 If the individual has only 
one job during the year, the monthly wage is the ratio between annual labour earnings and the 
number of months in employment. If the worker has two different employment spells we 
combine the information on annual earnings with the wage declared at the time of the interview 
                                                 
3 Information on hours worked is also available but it restricts the sample very much so we use the monthly wage as 
the endogenous variable. Previous works show that wage losses based on monthly wage are bigger than those based 
on hourly wage. This could be due to changes in monthly hours.  
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to obtain the monthly wage.
4 We use the CPI of each country to obtain real monthly wages, 
which are all them expressed in Euros (Real terms of 1993). 
Three types of workers exist: stayers, voluntary movers and involuntary movers. The stayers are 
those workers that remain at the same job between two consecutive interviews. The voluntary 
character of the job separation is not explicitly reported so we require an ad hoc definition. We 
consider as voluntary movers all the job changes characterized by the absence of an 
unemployment spell in between the two jobs.
5 Equivalently, involuntary movers are workers 
that experience a spell of unemployment between two jobs. 
Operationally, a job separation occurs every time an individual is observed finishing a particular 
job. In most of the empirical literature, job separation variables are broadly defined whenever an 
individual is observed to have different employers at two consecutive or non-consecutive 
interviews. Hence, they cannot identify wages at the moment of moving to another job, that is, 
accepted wages. But the point at which wages are measured is relevant to correctly measure the 
costs produced by a spell of unemployment, especially because there may be on-the-job wage 
growth. Given the way we construct the data, we are able to get wages at the moment of 
moving. Thus, we can approximate the idea of accepted wages.   
We start off by taking a look at the main sample characteristics of our data for the three types of 
workers: involuntary movers, voluntary mover and stayers. Table 1 shows these main sample 
characteristics for the three types of workers. Level of studies consists of three dummy variables 
that classify the levels of studies as superior, medium and primary. Gender is a dummy variable 
that takes value one if the worker is a woman; Marital Status takes value one if the worker is 
single and zero otherwise; other unemployment experience takes value one if, before the 
previous job, the individual experienced a spell of unemployment; Tenure in the previous job is 
measured in months and has been divided into four categories. 
We can find in Table 1 important differences between the three subsamples used: stayers, 
voluntary movers and involuntary movers. Firstly, women, young workers and those with 
primary studies have higher probabilities of being involuntary movers. Job movers tend to have 
low tenure but this fact is especially relevant for involuntary job movers where more than half 
of them come from jobs with tenure lower than twelve months. In Spain and France more than 
60% of unemployed workers had been employed for less than 12 months. Related to this last 
result, we can observe in Table 1 that more than half of the workers had previous spells of 
unemployment. This is clearly related to the fact that a high percentage of these workers enter 
into temporary jobs after the spell of unemployment. This evidences that workers who 
experience an involuntary job change have a large probability of experiencing another spell of 
unemployment within next 12 months. On the contrary, stayers are basically older workers with 
higher level of studies and with longer tenures. 
Though one could think that on-the-job search should be larger for voluntary job movers, 
sample data shows that the ratio of on-the-job search
6 is higher for involuntary movers. The 
                                                 
4 This method can introduce measurement errors in wages but given the aim of this paper we consider important to 
include in the sample those individuals with more than one employment spell during a year. 
5 Obviously, in this way we are considering as voluntary some cases where the job change is induced by the 
employer. For example, if the employer announces in advance to the worker that he will be laid off, forcing him to 
search on-the-job, and he finds another job before being fired.  
6 On-the-job search is a dummy variable that takes value one if the employed individual declares to be looking for 
another job at the time of the interview. This variable is not available for Germany. 
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majority of workers had a full time job and those with a part-time job are more common in the 
group of involuntary movers. Finally, the majority of involuntary movers considered in the 
sample experience spells of unemployment shorter or equal to six months.   
In Table 2 we present the sample mean of current wages for each type of worker. As can be 
seen, on average terms voluntary movers and stayers have higher wages than involuntary 
movers
7 and job stayers have larger wages than voluntary job movers. This finding is consistent 
with the view that there could be a self-selection process. Individuals who profit by staying with 
the same employer choose to do so if they can, while others face alternative wage structures and 
act accordingly. Therefore, high wage workers change job less frequently than low wage 
workers.  
The last column computes the wage gap of involuntary job movers relative to stayers. The wage 
gap between involuntary job movers and job stayers is negative and ranges from 12.36% in 
Portugal to 34.21% in France. The wage gap between involuntary and voluntary job movers is 
also negative and clearly lower. It ranges from 23.17% of Germany to 41.21% in France. From 
this data we would conclude that involuntary job mobility exert large negative returns. In the 
second column we present the wage gap of voluntary job movers relative to job stayers. Again, 
we obtain large wage losses that range from 1.29% of Germany to 27.09% in Portugal. 
However, this measure of the wage gap does not reflect the net cost that a spell of 
unemployment has on worker wages nor the return from voluntary job mobility. This cost or 
return can be higher or lower than the one estimated from observed wage differentials because 
wage dynamics may be different between individuals due to differences in observed 
characteristics. Moreover, the sample of workers who experience voluntary and involuntary job 
mobility could be a non-random sample of the pull of workers, and thus their mean wage may 
not represent that of a random worker who experiences a job change, but rather the expected 
wage conditional on voluntary or involuntary changing jobs.  
4 MODEL  SPECIFICATION 
The effect of having a spell of unemployment before the worker´s current job can be empirically 
analysed using the following augmented Mincerian earning model as specified in Jacobson, 
LaLonde and Sullivan (1993). 
(1)  Wxd u αβ δ υλ =+ + + +        ( 1 )  
where w represents the current wage, X includes some observed exogenous regressors and υ 
represents some unobservable components. Finally, d is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the individual experiences a job change and zero otherwise and u denotes the conventional 
regression error term.  
The problem here, however, is that applying OLS to equation (1) will not produce an unbiased 
estimate of λ if the unobservable component υ is correlated with the dummy variable d. This 
                                                 
7 This situation also holds for wages before and after the transition. This lower previous wage for job movers is 
related to the fact that younger workers with lower tenure and other unemployment experiences mainly compose this 
group and it shows that it is relevant to control by previous labour situation to analyse the effect of unemployment on 
re-employment wages. 
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would be the case if, for example, the unobservable component υ include unobserved aspects of 
the individual’s ability, which simultaneously lead to higher wages and a higher probability of 
experiencing job changes. In this case the type of transition is said to be endogenous. Moreover, 
this endogeneity does not only bias the conventional estimate of the parameter λ, but also the 
estimates of the marginal effects of the other wage determinants that are correlated with the 
unobserved variables.
8  
Another important shortcoming of the approach just presented is that it assumes that the 
observables have the same marginal effects on wages independent of the type of worker 
considered.
9 This assumption imposes a restriction on the model, which can also bias the results.  
Some previous papers (Lefranc, 2003; Eliason and Storrie, 2004) use a “difference-in-
difference” estimator approach to estimate wage costs from passing through a spell of 
unemployment. However, this approach has also some relevant shortcomings. Firstly, it imposes 
the restriction that without the treatment, the behaviour of both groups would have been the 
same (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998). Secondly, the marginal effects of observables on 
the outcome must be the same. Thirdly, they only consider workers with wages observed at two 
moments in time, mainly between two years, and therefore they omit those workers that are still 
unemployed at the time of the interview and they are not able to capture the effect of different 
job changes that could happen during the same interval on wages. As stated in Arulampalam 
(2001) this restriction can be especially relevant for workers that have different spells of 
unemployment and employment during the same year. Related to this fact, with this approach 
we can not measure the effect of the length of the spell of unemployment on subsequent wages. 
Finally, they do not distinguish between workers that change job voluntarily from workers that 
stay at the same job.  
In order to address these problems, we propose to analyse wage differentials between voluntary 
and involuntary job movers and job stayers by estimating an endogenous switching regression 
model. The endogenous switching model may be related to non-random sampling and 
endogenous treatment. In this framework, the source of endogeneity is the existence of 
unobservable variables that influence the type of transition made by the worker. Moreover, they 
could be correlated with the observables and unobservables of the wage equation. For instance, 
models of human capital predict that workers with less specific human capital will be more 
likely to voluntary move and at the same time these workers will have less tenure and lower 
wages. Similarly, workers with less ability will have lower observed wages and a higher 
probability of being fired from their job and therefore experiencing a spell of unemployment. 
This introduces a bias on the estimated effects of unemployment on wages, since the 
counterfactual –the wage the individual would have experienced had they stayed at the job– is 
not observed. In summary, in models involving endogenous switching, conventional least 
squares methods will spuriously attribute unobservable influences to the observable variables, 
including the switching variable. 
We consider a situation where for each sampled observation only one among the J dependent 
variables Wj – wages- is observed. Specifically, the observations on our dependent variable can 
                                                 
8 Some papers, for instance Arulampalam (2001) and Lefranc (2003), estimate wage penalties using panel data 
methods and therefore they cannot measure the wage penalty in the re-employment wage.   
9 That is to say that the return from tenure is the same for a voluntary mover than for an involuntary mover. However, 
we could imagine that a voluntary mover changes to a job with similar characteristics to the previous one and 
therefore he can transfer to his new job some of the human capital skills acquired in the previous job. 
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be classified into three regimes, involuntary movers, voluntary movers and stayers respectively, 
which are generated by different probability laws: 
(2)  jj j j WX u β =+ ,   j = 1 , 2 , 3         ( 2 )    
Where  Wj represents potential wages for a worker in state j. The selection mechanism is 
described through a latent variable model that describes the propensity towards being in one of 
the possible J states. As it is common in the latent variable approach, it is not possible to 
observe Ij but only its realization:  
(3)  { } max , j=1,2,3 kj Ik I I =⇔ >        ( 3 )  
that is, the worker will be observed in state k if the total value associated with this state is 
greater than the value in every other possible state. The latent variable model may be interpreted 
as a reduced form approach, where supply and demand side effects mix and cannot be 
disentangled. This implies that the behaviour of the worker and the functioning of the labour 
market jointly generate what we observe, Ij. The estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables therefore capture the joint effect of genuine preferences of the worker and the 
employer’s preferences as regards the worker’s characteristics. And therefore we have that: 
(4)  k WW = ,  if   { },1 , 2 , 3 kj IM a x Ij ==        ( 4 )        
We assume that Ij depends on observable and unobservable variables:  
(5)  jj j j IZ γ ε =+           ( 5 )    
where  Zj represents a vector of individual specific explanatory variables that describes the 
determinants of the selection process, γj is the corresponding vector of unknown parameters to 
be estimated and εj is the random component of the selection equation.  
The above discrete model can easily be estimated using a multinomial logit model, which has 
the advantage of greater simplicity, but imposes very strong restrictions on the errors structure 
of the selection process. In fact, the multinomial logit model is based on the assumption that 
errors are independently distributed with type I extreme value distribution function, which 
implies the implicit assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
10. This is 
unlikely to be true if certain characteristics of the labour market states make two of them closer 
- that is, more similar than the third one. This does not happen in the case of the Multinomial 
Probit model. Henceforth we have decided to estimate the selection process using a multinomial 
probit, which assumes that the error terms are distributed as a trivariate normal with covariance 
matrixΣ , in which any term outside the main diagonal can be different from zero.  
                                                 
10 This means that the utilities deriving from the three choices are mutually uncorrelated for the same individual, that 
is,  achieving a higher propensity  towards being in state k does not tell us anything about the propensity  towards 
being in any other state. 
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4.1  Identification and estimation in the multinomial probit model    
The trivariate probit model assumes that individuals select one of the three mutually exclusive 
alternatives. The identification problem arises from the fact that it is not possible to get unique 
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the multinomial probit, Σ and γ. Dansie 
(1985) gives the first systematic explanation of the sources of the identification problem in 
multinomial probit models. The first source of identification problem is that the observed 
choices are only informative in regard to the differences of the utilities (latent variables) and not  
the utilities themselves. This means that all the probabilities that enter the likelihood function 
can be written in difference terms without altering the value of the likelihood function.  
In our three-choice model, we chose as a reference alternative j=3, which in our case 
corresponds with the group of stayers. Thus, we will have two selection equations: 
(6) 
** *
3 ll l ll IIIZ γ ε =−= +        ( 6 )    
where 
*
3 ll γ γγ =−,
*
3 ll ε εε =−,  l=1,2. As a consequence, the relevant distribution of the 












         ( 7 )  
with  ( )
** *
12 1 2 , Cov σ εε = .  
Given the lack of information on the scale of the variance in this matrix, it is necessary to 
impose a restriction on Σ
*, and only two out of the three parameters of the bivariate covariance 
matrix are identified. The usual way of imposing this identification restriction is to standardize 
it in order to have the first utility disturbance with unitary variance.   
4.2  The likelihood function  
The estimation strategy used is the following. Given the fact that we are interested in estimating 
jointly the wage equations and the selection process, the likelihood function has to add the 
information relative to the wage process and to take account of the endogeneity of the selection 
process. We estimate the endogenous switching model by full maximum likelihood
11 because 
this method is more efficient than the two step estimation method proposed by Heckman 
(1979).
12 The likelihood function to be estimated has the following form: 
                                                 
11 An alternative is to estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood. There is a study (Weeks, 1997) which 
shows that simulated maximum likelihood (SML) when applied to a multinomial probit model with only individual 
characteristics exhibited considerable bias. Difficulty was encountered in the estimation of both mean equation and 
covariance parameters. 
12 The two-step estimators are never fully efficient in the sense that they never attain the Cramer-Rao lower bound. 
The efficient estimator is the full information maximum likelihood, which estimates the earnings and type of 
transition equations jointly. 
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   (8) 
Where the term ϕ(Wj) describes the density function of wages (j=0,1,2) and Φ(I*/Wj) the 
cumulative distribution function of the bivariate selection process conditional on wages.   
Moreover, in order to use all the information available on the data we also take into account the 
contribution of the censored and missing observations on wages. Some missing observations 
emerged because we know the worker has changed job but we cannot observe his wage at the 
following job. Censored observations are also related to the fact that the individual is still 
unemployed at the time of the interview. Therefore, as shown in expression (8), the likelihood 
function has three main parts and each part has two components. The first component describes 
the contribution of the uncensored observations to the likelihood (cj) and the second component 
the contribution of censored or missing observations to the likelihood (1-cj). 
To test for the endogeneity of the switching model the parameters of interest are the covariances 
of the error term of each wage equation with the error term of the selection equations.  If these 
covariances are different from zero, then the selection process is not exogenous and the 
estimation of the wage equations by OLS would give inconsistent estimators of the parameters 
of the model. The covariance of the error terms in the selection equations informs us about the 
adequacy of using the multinomial probit model to describe the selection process.  
From the estimation of this model we obtain unconditional and conditional wage predictions. 
The unconditional prediction is defined as the average predicted wage for all individuals in the 
sample. The conditional wage prediction represents the mean predicted wage for each worker 
type. For each worker we have observed one wage and we have to estimate the potential or 
counterfactual wages of the other two labour states. 
To illustrate the way we compute the relative wage return or cost from job instability, we 
describe the expected wages for the group of involuntary movers: 






01 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 /0 ,0
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>> = + +
−
    (9) 
where θ00 and θ01 are functions of the correlations between the error terms of the wage and the 
selection equations: 
(10)  () ( ) ** * * ** * *
00 01 10 01 00 10 00 01 ,
uu uu εε ε ε εε ε ε θρρ ρ θρρ ρ =− =−        ( 1 0 )  
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If the selection process is not endogenous then these correlations between the error term of the 
wage equation and the error term of the selection equation will be zero and therefore the 
estimated parameters θ00 and θ01 will also be zero.    
The terms λ0 and λ1 control the bivariate process that describes the probability of being an 
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   (11) 
Therefore the cost related to job instability can be obtained by taking the difference between the 
wage equations for the observed state and each of the counterfactuals, which can be computed 
in the same way.  
5 ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
This study looks at the effects of job mobility on individual real wages by estimating a 
multinomial endogenous switching regression model composed by two selection equations and 
three wage equations.  
The variables considered in the selection equation control the observed heterogeneity that 
influences the type of transition and are based on the theoretical predictions presented in Section 
2. For instance, theoretical models give some insight into the effects of tenure, wages, labour 
market experience, search intensity and productivity on the probability of being a job mover, all 
variables considered in our analysis. As it is common in this literature the marginal productivity 
of workers is approximated by the level of studies, the general capital skills by age and specific 
capital skills by tenure. Finally, search models predict a negative relationship between wages 
and job mobility as the acceptance probability decreases with workers´ reservation wage, which 
is approximated by the current wage.  
Empirical research has suggested that the best predictor of an individual’s future risk of 
unemployment is his past history of unemployment (Arulampalam, 2001). To test this 
assumption we include as a regressor in the selection equation other unemployment experiences. 
Therefore we will expect that individuals with other unemployment experiences will have a 
higher probability of experiencing more spells of unemployment
13.  
The wage equations include the usual set of control variables that explain current wages. In 
particular, traditional human capital variables such as age and level of studies are present in 
these equations. Besides, we also control for some characteristics of the current job such as type 
of occupation, type of contract and whether the job is part-time or full time
14. 
When comparing wages it is important to define the point at which the wage information is 
measured. The length of separation and also the time in employment up to the point of wage 
                                                 
13 We find this point to be especially interesting because wage losses may become permanent as the worker 
repeatedly enter into new spells of unemployment. 
14 The majority of papers that study wage losses after a spell of unemployment focus on workers in full time jobs. 
However, as Farber (1993) shows, a significant portion of full time workers return to part time jobs and we think this 
fact should be considered in the present analysis as a source of the costs produced by the unemployment period. 
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measurement are important as both will affect the measurement of the wage change associated 
with separation. Hence, for involuntary and voluntary job movers we use accepted wages and in 
the wage equation for involuntary movers we introduce, as a regressor, the duration of the 
unemployment spell. With this specification we can investigate whether current wages are 
negatively related to unemployment duration. Non-stationary search models (see García Pérez, 
2004) predict that reservation wages decrease in accordance with the spell of unemployment 
and human capital models state that an unemployed individual looses general human capital 
skills. Thereby, both models predict a negative correlation between accepted wages and the 
length of the unemployment spell.  
To identify the model in other way than through the normality assumption on the error terms, 
we need various exclusion restrictions. We exclude the following variables from the wage 
equation: On-the-job search, Marital Status, the presence of Children younger than 15 years 
old, Household income and Full time job in previous job. In the selection equation Full time job 
refers to the previous job while in the wage equation Full time job refers to the current job. 
5.1  The probability of experiencing a spell of unemployment 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the two selection equations. As we have taken the 
group of stayers as the reference category the first selection equation describes the determinants 
of the probability of being an involuntary job mover instead of being a stayer and the second 
selection equation describes the probability of being a voluntary job mover instead of being a 
stayer. The probability of being an involuntary job mover relative to being a voluntary job 
mover is derived from these two predicted probabilities. Most of the signs of our coefficients 
estimates are widely established in the literature, and thus unremarkable. Hence our discussion 
will focus primarily on the effect of involuntary and voluntary job mobility on wages.  
Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients of the selection equation and Tables 5 and 6 display 
the results of the estimation of the two selection equations for the exogenous and endogenous 
multinomial switching regression model. In order to compare the results obtained from the 
exogenous and the endogenous model we will provide both estimation results but we will focus 
on those results we find more relevant given the aim of the paper.   
An inspection of the correlation coefficient of the multinomial probit reported in Table 4 shows 
the relevance of the multinomial probit model in correctly estimating the probability of 
voluntary and involuntary job mobility. The economic interpretation of this parameter is not 
clear cut as they represent the correlation between the error terms of the selection equations for 
the involuntary and voluntary movers previously normalized in respect to the group of stayers. 
For all the countries analysed, this correlation is positive and statistically significant. This fact 
indicates that the worker differentiates between the alternative of being an involuntary mover 
and the alternative of being a stayer. Moreover, he also finds the alternative of being a voluntary 
mover different in respect to being a stayer. In other words, when job stability and involuntary 
job mobility are considered different alternatives, voluntary job mobility is also considered as 
being barely related to job stability.  
The signs of the different coefficients of both selection equations are as expected. For instance, 
we obtain a non-linear relationship between age and the probability of changing job involuntary 
in all the countries. Involuntary job mobility relative to staying at the job increases with age 
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until around 35-40 years old and then starts decreasing. When we focus on job movers we  find 
out that involuntary job mobility decreases with age until  reaching a maximum of around 30 
years old, when  it starts increasing.  
The level of studies also helps to explain job mobility behaviour. When we focus on 
unemployed versus stable workers all the countries show the same result: the higher the level of 
studies, the lower the probability of experiencing a spell of unemployment. However the 
relationship between the level of studies and voluntary job mobility differs between the 
countries and this fact may imply differences in the nature of this type of transition. In Spain 
and Portugal, the level of studies is negatively correlated with voluntary job mobility, though in 
Portugal  secondary studies is not statistically significant. On the contrary, in Germany and 
France the results show that, as stated in job search models, those workers with superior studies 
have the highest probability of changing job voluntarily
15.  In all countries it is found that the 
probability of changing job with an intermediate spell of unemployment is higher for low 
educated workers. 
Our results ratified the scarring effect of unemployment mentioned in previous work, as the 
estimated parameter of other unemployment experience is positive and statistically significant in 
the first selection equation. This implies that workers with unemployment experience previous 
to the current job have a higher probability of repeating a spell of unemployment. This effect 
does not arise for voluntary job movers as the parameter associated with this variable is not 
statistically significant in Germany, Portugal and France. On the contrary in Spain workers with 
previous experiences of unemployment have larger probabilities of being voluntary job movers. 
Again we consider this result as a signal of the differing nature of voluntary job mobility in this 
country. 
As expected, On-the-job search is positively correlated with the probability of changing jobs, 
both involuntary and voluntary but the effect is stronger for unemployed workers. From search 
models we know that search activity is positively related to job-to-job transitions while from job 
matching models the relation could be the opposite because a worker searches when there is 
some kind of mismatch at their current job and therefore the worker also faces a higher 
probability of entering into a spell of unemployment. Tenure in the previous job is also relevant 
to explain the propensity of being a job mover and as human capital and matching models 
predict, the probability of changing jobs is higher the lower the tenure of the worker. This 
relation holds for voluntary and involuntary job movers though if we compare these two types 
of workers we observe that except for Spain, workers with tenure lower than 24 months have 
the highest probability of having a spell of unemployment relative to voluntarily changing job.
16  
Finally,  previous wages also explain the type of transition and we obtain that, except for 
Germany, low wage workers face a larger probability of experiencing a spell of unemployment 
while for voluntary job movers this variable is only relevant in Spain. 
 Therefore the characteristics that explain the probability of experiencing an involuntary job 
separation seem to be pretty similar among the countries analysed. Some differences arise when 
we study voluntary job movers, especially for Spain. We find these differences may be 
                                                 
15 This result could be due to differences in the arrival rate of job offers while employed. In a parallel paper we define 
a job search model where we can test this idea. 
16 This conclusion is derived from the comparison of the coefficients of the tenure dummies in both selection 
equations. 
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important as they may reflect the differing nature of voluntary job change. In fact, in Spain and 
Portugal, voluntary and involuntary job movements seem to be more similar alternatives than in 
Germany and France.  
5.2 Wage  equations 
In order to show the biases derived when we estimate the wage equation omitting the selectivity 
problem we present the results for the multinomial exogenous and endogenous switching model.  
We have estimated three wage equations, one for each labour state, to allow for the 
heterogeneity of the marginal effects of observable variables on the worker’s current wage. The 
results are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8. The comparison of the estimated coefficients for the 
variables such as age, level of studies, previous wage or tenure between the wage equations 
shows that it is relevant to specify different wage equations because the marginal effects of the 
observables on current wages depend on the type of transition
17. The current wage of job 
movers depends positively on previous wages but it is also clearly related to the personal and 
labour characteristics of the worker.  
Women earn lower wages, this gap being higher for voluntary job movers in Spain and Portugal 
and for involuntary job movers in Germany and France. Except for Germany, we find a non-
linear relation between age  and current wages and a positive relation between the level of 
studies and wages. These results are consistent with the theoretical models as age approximates 
total labour market experience and level of studies approximates individual´s productivity. 
Therefore both variables simultaneously determine a worker’s reservation wage and signal the 
worker’s skills to the employer.   
Interesting results are obtained for the variable tenure in previous job when we compare the 
results derived from the exogenous model with the endogenous one. Firstly, it is important to 
take account of the different nature of this variable between job movers and job stayers. For job 
stayers, previous tenure describes the tenure in the current job at the time the wage change is 
measured, while for the group of job movers this variable describes the tenure of the worker at 
the time of that job change. In the exogenous models the effect of tenure in previous job on 
current wages is positive and statistically significant. As we are conditioning on age, this result 
would imply that among workers with similar amounts of labour market experience, those who 
have spent more time with their current employer tend to have higher earnings. However in the 
endogenous switching model, tenure in previous job is only statistically significant for job 
stayers showing that long tenure stable workers tend to have higher wages. This difference 
proves that the exogenous models are biased due to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The observed positive relation between current wages and tenure in previous job obtained in the 
exogenous model is spurious.  
We have estimated the wage equation by controlling for the previous wage and we treat this 
variable as an approximation of the worker’s reservation wage. The inclusion of this variable 
requires some comments. Previous studies estimate wage penalties from a spell of 
unemployment using wage change as the endogenous variable. However we have used wage 
                                                 
17 This approach is especially relevant for the variable previous wage as we consider that the wage previously earned 
approximates a worker’s reservation wage. For voluntary job movers and job stayers, this assumption does not cause 
any problems but for unemployed people the reservation wage tends to be lower than the previous wage. Therefore to 
impose equality on this coefficient could determine a form of misspecification.  
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levels for several reasons. First, using wage change as an endogenous variable is equivalent to 
restricting the coefficient of the previous wage to one on the wage equation specified in levels. 
While this assumption may be reasonable for job stayers, this could be too restrictive for job 
movers and, as shown in Tables 6 and 7, this seems to be the case. On the other hand, with the 
selection equation we are already controlling unobserved variables, related to both individual 
and job effects, which may bias the coefficient of the previous wage. As expected, in all cases, 
previous wage is positively correlated to current wage, though this relation is stronger for job 
stayers. 
The length of the unemployment spell also explains the behaviour of current wages, though this 
relation is not lineal. In Spain, Germany and France, wages start decreasing with unemployment 
duration and at a certain point, around six months, it starts increasing. In Portugal the effect 
seems slightly different and wages only decrease after a certain number of months of 
unemployment. This evidences that reservation wages adjust down during the spell of 
unemployment. 
5.3  Wage losses from unemployment 
Once we have estimated the model, taking into account the self-selection problem, we can 
obtain predicted wages for involuntary job movers and their predicted counterfactuals, which is 
the wage that involuntary job movers would have earned having stayed at the job or having 
experienced a job-to-job transition.  Hence, we can study if, as most of the theoretical model 
predicts, involuntary job mobility implies negative wage mobility in the wage distribution and if 
these wage penalties are homogenous among different types of individuals. 
 First, we present the results for the correlation structure of the error terms and the likelihood 
ratio test for the endogenous switching model with respect to the exogenous one, which is the 
restricted case. These results are presented in Table 9. For the correlation terms, the first row 
represents the estimated parameter and the second its p-value. The likelihood ratio test together 
with the correlation parameters
18 tell us that there is evidence of non-random selection and 
hence, if we omit the effect of unobservables, predicted wages for movers and stayers would be 
inconsistently estimated as well as the wage penalty of involuntary job moving
19.   
In Table 10 we present predicted wage changes for involuntary job movers for sample means in 
each group of workers. In order to evaluate the importance of the non-random selection problem 
we show wage returns derived from an exogenous and an endogenous switching model. The 
results in this table confirm that the observed wage differentials previously shown are related to 
observe characteristics and therefore these differentials are not adequate to value the returns or 
costs from job mobility. Secondly, if we do not consider the self-selection problem we will 
underestimate the wage penalty derived from unemployment and this bias seems to be larger 
                                                 
18 These correlations do not have a clear interpretation as in the bivariate switching regression model. This is due to 
the fact that we have estimated the selection equations in a different form. For instance, recall that the correlation 
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19 Not all the correlation terms are statistically significant. However this does not mean that the endogenous model 
should be rejected. A log-likelihood ratio test on all the correlation elements would have more power than the t-test 
used on individual coefficient estimates. 
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when voluntary job movers are the control group. The results reported do not allow us to define 
a range of countries by wage losses as the amount of the wage penalty depends on the group we 
are comparing with. Firstly, when compare to stayers, German workers have larger wage 
penalties than in the rest of countries, followed by French and Spanish workers. Portuguese 
workers experience the lowest wage penalties. If we compare involuntary movers with 
voluntary job movers these wage losses are larger in all the cases. These relative costs are larger 
in France, followed by Germany, Portugal and Spain.   
One interesting result is that in all countries estimated wage differentials are larger when we 
take voluntary job movers as the comparison group. This fact implies that, on average, job-to-
job transitions give positive returns to workers in the four economies analysed
20. In Germany, 
workers that suffer a spell of unemployment earn around 22% less than if they had stayed at the 
job. In France and Spain this wage loss is around 11% and 10% respectively. And our results 
show that Portuguese workers have the lower wage penalties, around 5%.  
The type of study presented offers the chance to analyse the behaviour of wage penalties in 
relation to different personal and labour characteristics and in fact, some interesting results 
emerge. These results are displayed in Table 11. For example, if job tenure contributes to the 
accumulation of specific human capital or seniority rights, wage losses, when compared to job 
stayers, should be positively associated with tenure. This is the result found in Portugal where 
wage losses relative to stayers move from around 1% for workers with tenure lower than 24 
months to 15% for workers with tenure larger than four years. In Germany and France, wage 
losses increases with tenure for short and medium tenure workers. In Spain, we obtain a similar 
result but only when the comparison group is voluntary job movers. We could conclude that 
these wage losses are also related to the accumulation of specific human capital, as the 
voluntary job movers have been able to carry them on to the new job. In fact, these wage 
penalties can be associated with the loss of specific human capital, as we have already 
considered the unobserved heterogeneity effect.  
Concerning worker´s age the results show that wage losses tend to be the largest for older 
workers when the control group is the stayers. On the contrary, wage losses are larger for 
medium age workers when we compare involuntary and voluntary job movers. The size of wage 
penalties differs among workers with different level of studies and simultaneously depends on 
the type of transition. When we compare involuntary job movers with job stayers we observe 
that workers with secondary and primary studies suffer the highest wage penalties. This finding 
is consistent with the argument that more educated workers have more transferable human 
capital. However, involuntary job movers with primary studies suffer the lowest wage penalties 
relative to having a job-to-job transition. This last result is related to the way low educated 
workers tend to move up on the wage distribution and evidences that these workers tend to 
experience wage losses even when experiencing job-to-job transitions
21.  
We next examine how wage losses vary according to the worker´s position on the wage 
distribution. Interestingly, the relationship between this variable and the wage penalty of 
unemployment depends on the reference group. If we measure the wage penalty of the 
                                                 
20 In fact, in Spain job movers have wages that are around 13% higher than involuntary job movers and 2% higher 
than stayers. In Germany these quantities are 43% and 15%, in Portugal 31% and 7% and in France 35% and 15% 
respectively.  
21 For instance, in Spain, Germany and Portugal low educated workers, when experiencing a job-to-job transition, 
experience wage losses relative to stayers of around 10%, 9% and 8% respectively. 
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involuntary job mover relative to staying at the job we observe that workers with high wages in 
the previous job seem to experience the largest wage penalty, ranging from 31% in Spain to 
42% in France. This result seems to be consistent with the findings of Burda and Mertens 
(2001) who report that German workers located on the upper quartile of the wage distribution 
experienced larger wage losses. However, in Portugal this group of workers experience the 
lowest wage penalties when we take voluntary job movers as the counterfactual case.  
As signalling and non-stationary job search models state, unemployment duration also plays an 
important role in determining the size of the wage penalty. We observe that in Spain, Germany 
and France wage penalties increase with the length of the spell of unemployment during the first 
year of the spell, -though only slightly in Germany-, and afterwards they tend to decay. On the 
contrary, in Portugal wage penalties start decreasing at around the sixth month of 
unemployment but they keep increasing afterwards.  
Finally we have re-estimated the endogenous switching model using the type of contract in the 
worker´s current job as a explanatory variable. We have distinguished two contract categories, 
fixed contract and temporary contract and we have interacted this variable with the variable 
indicating whether the job is full or part-time. Results are displayed on Table 12 where we 
present wage losses for full time and part-time workers in their previous job
22. As expected, 
large wage losses relative to stayers are found when the workers changes from a full time job to 
part-time job. Also, and except for Portugal, wage losses relative to stayers are larger when we 
compare workers in temporary jobs to workers in jobs with permanent contracts. On the second 
half of Table 12 we report wage losses of workers who were in part-time jobs. In this case we 
find relative wage gains when we compare involuntary job movers with stayers. These wage 
gains arise when the worker gets a full time job and they decrease when he enters into a job with 
a temporary contract.  
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed the relationship between job mobility and wage mobility and we 
have tried to measure how painful unemployment is in terms of relative wage costs for the 
worker in Spain, Germany, Portugal and France using the European Community Household 
Panel, 1994-2001. For this purpose we have defined three types of labour states, stayers, 
voluntary job movers and involuntary job movers, and we have estimated a multinomial 
endogenous switching regression model composed by two selection equations and three wage 
equations, one for each labour market state. From this estimation we have derived potential 
wages for each labour state and the subsequent wage losses when a worker suffers a spell of 
unemployment in relation to experiencing a job-to-job transition or to staying in the same job.  
The main findings of this research suggest some conclusions that can be grouped into two main 
categories. First, from the econometric point of view, we have shown that the multinomial 
probit model is the proper option to describe the probability of being in one of the possible 
labour states analysed: stayers, voluntary job movers and involuntary job movers. We have 
obtained that the correlation between alternatives is statistically significant and that voluntary 
                                                 
22 When a worker moves from a full time job to a part time job monthly wages will change only because hourly 
wages change. Nevertheless we consider this wage changes as a wage loss in the sense that total earnings have 
decreased and because, as empirical work has shown, part time job can be a mechanism to get out of the 
unemployment trap.    20
and involuntary job mobility are closer alternatives. From the correlation coefficient of the 
selection equation we have shown that these similarities between voluntary and involuntary job 
movers are especially strong for Spain and Portugal.    
We have also showed that it is important to take account of observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity if we are interested in measuring the effects of unemployment on re-employment 
wages. Observed wage differentials overestimate wage costs from an unemployment because 
the observed characteristics of unemployed workers differ from the other two types of workers. 
However, to estimate wage changes from job mobility it is not only relevant to take account of 
observe heterogeneity since selectivity and endogeneity problems may arise in this type of 
studies. Indeed, we have shown that if we do not control by selectivity we may underestimate 
wage losses after a period of unemployment. Moreover, we have observed that the effect of 
tenure in the previous job is positive and statistically significant for job movers only in the 
exogenous model while in the endogenous model this variable lacks statistical significance and 
evidences the existence of unobserved heterogeneity.   
Second the empirical results revealed that wage losses after unemployment exist in the four 
countries analysed and these wage losses are larger when voluntary job movers are the 
comparison group. These results are interesting because, as theoretical models predict, it shows 
that the returns from job-to-job transitions are positive in relation to involuntary job movers and, 
what is more relevant, in relation to job stayers in the four countries analysed. We have found 
out that German and French workers tend to experience the largest wage penalties, 
independently of the reference group. Portuguese workers suffered lower wage losses than those 
suffered by Spanish workers when stayers are the reference group but larger when these losses 
are measured relative to voluntary job movers. These wage losses may be seen as the natural 
mechanism through which the labour market moves to a new equilibrium. However, we have 
also found that unemployed workers enter into jobs with a high destruction propensity as they 
tend to have repeated spells of unemployment and therefore each wage loss adds up to the 
previous one. From this perspective we can conclude that these wage losses have permanent 
effects on the worker´s future income. 
Results also indicate that the process of wage mobility in the labour market is characterised by 
some degree of variability among different types of workers and that, on average, the type of 
transition has a clear effect on the position of the worker in the wage distribution. Our results 
also provide useful indicators as to the factors responsible for observed wage losses, as 
significant differences are found when we measure wage penalties by different observed 
personal and labour characteristics. For example, signalling and non-stationary job search 
models predict wage penalties increase with the length of the unemployment spell. Part of the 
wage losses must also be related to the loss of specific human capital. The initial position in the 
wage distribution is also relevant, as workers with high wages in previous jobs seem to 
experience larger wage losses in relation to stayers. This may be due to some kind of wage 
rigidity on the low quartiles of the wage distribution. On the contrary, when wage losses are 
measured relative to voluntary job movers, the relation changes and low wage workers 
experience larger wage losses. Workers with a high level of studies experience the largest wage 
loss relative to staying at the job while low educated workers have the largest wage penalties 
relative to experiencing a job-to-job transition.    21
Finally, we have also found that wage gains from involuntary job changes may also arise but 
this happens when workers move from part time to full time jobs. Interestingly, these wage 
gains are lower when the new job has a temporary contract.  In accordance to this, wage losses 
are larger when a worker enters into a temporary job.  
Some questions remain open for future research. Firstly, the evidence we present in this paper 
suggests that wage losses after a spell of unemployment exists but we did not measure how long 
these wage looses persist as the worker remains employed. Secondly, which are the policy 
implications of these results and its relation with the source of the wage losses? As stated above, 
these wage losses are part of the adjustment mechanism of the labour market. However we have 
also found there are significant differences on the amount of wage losses depending on different 
observed characteristics that may suggest the need for some policy intervention. The 
stigmatisation or deterioration of human capital implies that wage losses increase during the 
spell of unemployment. These arguments lead one to focus on any policy that may reduce the 
time the unemployed need to find a job. On the other hand our research has shown that an 
unemployed worker has a high propensity of getting into repeated spells of unemployment 
turning initially small wage losses into large and permanent ones. In this case, a better policy 
option would be one that focuses on finding high quality matches rather than quickly finding a 
new job. 
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1.  Table 1: Sample Characteristics  
. Spain  Germany Portugal France 
  Involuntary Job Movers 
Woman 46.57%  41.67%  51.67%  53.76% 
Superior Studies  16.18%  16.03%  5.21%  19.44% 
Medium Studies  21.82%  60.77%  11.45%  34.32% 
Age (18-30)  43.06%  28.12%  41.83%  45.43% 
Age (30-45)  36.66%  40.06%  33.72%  38.44% 
Tenure (<12)  76.05%  40.91%  57.15%  67.43% 
Tenure (12-24)  11.93%  33.02%  15.27%  13.96% 
Tenure (24-48)  7.08%  16.98%  19.92%  14.11% 
Previous Unempl. Spells  87.62%  60.12%  63.76%  74.56% 
Full time job  83.43%  84.65%  89.70%  71.99% 
On the job search  43.95%  -  22.59%  47.04% 
Unempl. Dur. (<3)  37.31%  43.76%  41.40%  48.12% 
Unempl. Dur. (3-6)  45.20%  41.48%  41.18%  32.10% 
N (%)  25.33% 26.46% 25.48%  15.39% 
  Voluntary Job Movers 
Woman 30.48%  39.25%  34.00%  41.45% 
Superior Studies  23.55%  29.39%  6.89%  32.55% 
Medium Studies  19.14%  55.20%  12.40%  32.55% 
Age (18-30)  40.81%  29.75%  54.82%  34.66% 
Age (30-45)  44.58%  55.73%  30.63%  47.31% 
Tenure (<12)  56.80%  29.39%  45.33%  29.98% 
Tenure (12-24)  17.38%  29.57%  17.15%  13.58% 
Tenure (24-48)  12.97%  18.81%  15.59%  23.65% 
Previous Unempl. Spells  48.07%  17.81%  28.85%  13.65% 
Full time job  90.43%  88.53%  95.10%  88.76% 
On the job search  19.65%  -  10.41%  26.93% 
N (%)  8.43% 6.62% 9.49%  5.18% 
 Stayers 
Woman 34.08%  40.51%  43.00%  44.56% 
Superior Studies  34.82%  25.66%  10.87%  29.08% 
Medium Studies  20.47%  57.93%  13.39%  38.57% 
Age (18-30)  17.14%  14.69%  25.79%  13.80% 
Age (30-45)  49.23%  47.61%  43.29%  48.75% 
Tenure (<12)  1.93%  0.00%  1.75%  0.04% 
Tenure (12-24)  7.89%  12.98%  7.91%  5.39% 
Tenure (24-48)  16.23%  23.83%  18.41%  16.81% 
Previous Unempl. Spells  7.14%  1.16%  4.38%  2.65% 
Full time job  95.65%  90.18%  96.17%  90.75% 
On the job search  5.90%  -  2.31%  4.52% 
N (%)  66.24% 66.93% 65.03%  79.43% 
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2.   
3.   
4.  Table 2: Wages by type of worker  
  
5.   
Current Wage  Wage gap of involuntary 
job movers  
Wage gap of voluntary 
job movers 
Involuntary Movers  1130  - - 
Voluntary Movers  1405  -19.46%  -  Spain 
Stayers 1780  -36.51%  -26.69% 
Involuntary Movers  1442  - - 
Voluntary Movers  1841  -23.18% -  Germany 
Stayers 1877  -23.17%  -1.69% 
Involuntary Movers  566  -  - 
Voluntary Movers  646  -12.36%  -  Portugal 
Stayers 821  -31.11%  -27.09% 
Involuntary Movers  1295  -  - 
Voluntary Movers  1975  -34.42%  -  France 
Stayers 2203  -41.21%  -11.54% 
6.   
7.   
8.   
9.   
10.   
11.   
12.   
13.   
14.   
15.   
16.     26
17.   
18.  Table 3: Selection Equation: Correlation term 
 Spain  Germany  Portugal  France 
0.84 0.49 0.90 0.49  **
10 ε ε ρ  
(0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) 
* The first row represents the estimated parameter and the second row its p-value 
 
19.  Table 4: Selection Equation: Involuntary job movers-job stayers 
  Exogenous switching  Endogenous Switching 
 Spain  Germany Portugal France Spain  Germany Portugal  France 
Constant  2.91 -0.43 1.06  1.30  4.14 0.62  1.50  2.11 
  (0.00) (0.13) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Sex  -0.07 -0.11 0.02  -0.08  -0.08 -0.15  0.01  -0.03 
  (0.04) (0.00) (0.29)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.00)  (0.40)  (0.23) 
Age  -6.99 -6.80 -3.82  -6.37  -6.43 -7.37  -2.53  -7.90 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Age squared  8.73 9.99 5.07  7.62  8.52  10.40 3.60  10.26 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
On-the-job search  0.51 - 0.71  0.88  0.57 -  0.44  0.83 
  (0.00) - (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Tenure (>48)  -2.11 -1.13 -1.83  -2.15  -2.61 -1.20  -2.28  -2.19 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Tenure (24-48)  -1.56 -0.46 -1.25  -1.61  -2.08 -0.76 -1.92  -1.81 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Children (<15)  0.15 0.03 0.02  0.11  0.15 0.01  0.03  0.08 
  (0.00) (0.26) (0.29)  (0.01)  (0.03) (0.39)  (0.15)  (0.06) 
0.04 0.05  -0.05  0.05  0.03 0.04  -0.02  0.08  Other Household 
Income  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Full time job  0.07 -0.20  -0.10  0.06  -0.02  -0.18  -0.16  -0.06 
  (0.09) (0.00) (0.08)  (0.18)  (0.32) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.18) 
Civil status  -0.01 0.13 0.01  0.17  -0.07 0.09  -0.04  0.10 
  (0.41) (0.01) (0.42)  (0.00)  (0.03) (0.00)  (0.17)  (0.04) 
Superior Studies  -0.30 -0.38 -0.18  -0.05  -0.26 -0.32  -0.34  -0.16 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)  (0.18)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Secondary Studies  -0.10 -0.18 -0.09  0.05  -0.10 -0.18  -0.15  0.02 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.07)  (0.17)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.37) 
Previous Wage  -0.27 0.03 -0.09  -0.13  -0.37  -0.04 -0.08  -0.22 
  (0.00) (0.21) (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.10)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
0.90 1.49 0.86  0.74  0.94 1.42  0.75  0.87  Previous Unemp. 
Experience  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
*Time dummies are included in the estimation. 
* The first row represents the estimated parameter and the second row its p-value 
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22.  Table 5: Selection Equation: Voluntary job movers-job stayers 
  Exogenous switching  Endogenous Switching 
 Spain  Germany  Portugal  France  Spain  Germany  Portugal  France 
Constant  1.76 -1.32 0.11  0.33 2.72 -1.94 1.28 -0.45 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.41) (0.31) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.10) 
Sex  -0.20 -0.08 -0.29 -0.11 -0.19 -0.07 -0.12 -0.09 
  (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age  -3.61 4.21 -1.01 -2.03 -2.01 3.82 -2.19 -0.16 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.22) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.47) 
Age squared  2.89 -7.78 -1.55 1.26 1.25 -6.88 1.62 -1.80 
  (0.12) (0.00) (0.29) (0.36) (0.20) (0.00) (0.33) (0.16) 
0.27 - 0.32  0.81  0.38 - 0.31  0.59  On-the-job 
search  (0.00) - (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) - (0.00)  (0.00) 
Tenure (>48)  -2.25 -0.95 -1.74 -2.04 -2.63 -1.02 -2.23 -1.76 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tenure (24-48)  -1.52 -0.58 -1.21 -1.52 -2.01 -0.71 -1.86 -1.48 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Children (<15)  0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.09) (0.48) (0.18) (0.01) (0.08) (0.46) (0.32) 
0.02 -0.03 0.04  0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01  Other Household 
Income  (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14) (0.22) 
Full time job  0.10 -0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.08  -0.04 0.06 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.29) (0.24) (0.25) (0.11) (0.31) (0.20) 
Single  -0.04 -0.02 -0.05  0.12 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 0.00 
  (0.20) (0.38) (0.21) (0.02) (0.04) (0.30) (0.09) (0.42) 
Superior Studies  -0.22 0.15 -0.10 0.02 -0.19 0.08 -0.26 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.18) (0.40) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.49) 
-0.13  0.00 -0.12  0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.11 0.04  Secondary 
Studies  (0.00) (0.47) (0.05) (0.15) (0.00) (0.47) (0.01) (0.34) 
Previous Wage  -0.15 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.26 0.07 -0.09 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.40) (0.13) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.48) 
0.32 0.00 -0.07 0.13 0.41 0.37 0.35 -0.04  Previous Unemp. 
Experience  (0.03) (0.49) (0.22) (0.45) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.34) 
*Time dummies are included in the estimation. 
* The first row represents the estimated parameter and the second row its p-value 
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31.  Table 6: Wage equation for involuntary job movers 
  Exogenous Model  Endogenous Model 
 Spain  Germany Portugal France Spain  Germany Portugal  France 
Constant  3.52  5.52 1.90  4.37 3.51  5.48 1.99  4.76 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Sex  -0.11  -0.22 -0.10  -0.21 -0.10  -0.21 -0.07  -0.22 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) 
Age  1.84  -1.41 1.40  2.31 1.27  -2.61 1.22  1.39 
  (0.00)  (0.21) (0.07)  (0.11) (0.00)  (0.05) (0.07)  (0.25) 
Age^2  -2.30 -0.32  -1.85  -2.68  -1.55 3.13  -1.57  -1.64 
  (0.00)  (0.43) (0.07)  (0.16) (0.00)  (0.07) (0.08)  (0.27) 
Superior Studies  0.13  0.00 0.32  0.17 0.12  0.02 0.21  0.10 
  (0.00)  (0.49) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.39) (0.00)  (0.02) 
0.00  0.06 0.05  0.02 0.02  0.09 0.03  -0.02  Secondary 
Studies  (0.45)  (0.21) (0.18)  (0.34) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.20)  (0.34) 
Full time job  0.38  0.18 0.29  0.37 0.40  0.20 0.21  0.35 
  (0.00)  (0.03) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00)  (0.00) 
-0.14  -0.07 0.03  -0.18  -0.11 -0.04 0.03  -0.15  Unemp. Duration
(0.00)  (0.30) (0.32)  (0.04) (0.00)  (0.33) (0.29)  (0.03) 
0.04  0.06 -0.03  0.08 0.03  0.05 -0.03  0.08  Unemp. 
Duration^2  (0.00)  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.02) (0.00)  (0.13) (0.09)  (0.02) 
Previous Wage  0.39  0.26 0.61  0.28 0.40  0.27 0.61  0.24 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Medium skill  0.08  0.09 -0.01  0.05 0.38  0.16 0.20  0.50 
  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.43)  (0.15) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) 
High skill  0.36  0.19 0.13  0.45 0.15  0.18 0.08  0.10 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.03)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.03)  (0.00) 
Tenure (>48)  0.07 0.12  0.04  0.22  0.04  -0.18  -0.09  -0.10 
  (0.02)  (0.00) (0.23)  (0.01) (0.41)  (0.11) (0.32)  (0.25) 
Tenure (24-48)  0.02  0.05 0.00  0.16  -0.01 -0.15  -0.07  0.07 
  (0.24)  (0.14) (0.46)  (0.16) (0.44)  (0.06) (0.22)  (0.26) 
*Time dummies are included in the estimation. 
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32.  Table 7: Wage equation for voluntary job movers 
  Exogenous Model  Endogenous Model 
 Spain  Germany Portugal France Spain  Germany Portugal  France 
Constant  3.91  2.94 2.78  4.18  4.08 3.15 2.88  3.69 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Sex  -0.21  -0.09 -0.19  -0.11  -0.18 -0.13 -0.18  -0.11 
  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Age  2.39  -0.08 2.75  -1.75  2.24 -0.12 3.10  2.89 
  (0.00)  (0.48) (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.00) (0.39) (0.00)  (0.08) 
-2.85  -0.32 -3.34  3.01 -2.64 -0.30 -3.79  -3.46  Age^2 
(0.01)  (0.43) (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00) (0.46) (0.00)  (0.05) 
0.17  0.01 0.42  0.27  0.15 0.07 0.42  0.20  Superior Studies
  (0.00)  (0.45) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.12) (0.00)  (0.00) 
0.08  -0.04 0.08  0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.10  0.05  Secondary 
Studies  (0.01)  (0.20) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.00) (0.20) (0.02)  (0.04) 
Full time job  0.35  0.12 0.29  0.29  0.36 0.10 0.33  0.26 
  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.00) 
Previous Wage  0.33  0.60 0.44  0.42  0.32 0.57 0.42  0.39 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Medium skill  0.05  0.09 0.10  -0.04  0.28 0.14 0.22  0.22 
  (0.09)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.22)  (0.10) (0.02) (0.00)  (0.25) 
High skill  0.32 0.19  0.22  0.17  0.11  -0.05  0.02  0.04 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Tenure (>48)  0.14  0.12 0.03  0.18  0.09 0.08 0.03  -0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.20) (0.26) (0.49)  (0.15) 
Tenure (24-48)  0.02  0.05 0.04  0.04  0.00 0.01 0.01  -0.07 
  (0.29)  (0.14) (0.08)  (0.22)  (0.48) (0.36) (0.44)  (0.49) 
*Time dummies are included in the estimation. 
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33.  Table 8: Wage equation for Stayers 
 Exogenous  Model  Endogenous Model 
 Spain  Germany Portugal France Spain  Germany Portugal  France 
Constant  0.02  0.05 0.34  0.47 0.89  0.57 0.12  0.41 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Sex  -0.05  -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 -0.04  -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Age  0.26  -0.16 0.04  0.10 0.35  -0.16 0.03  0.06 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.27)  (0.08) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.05)  (0.05) 
-0.22  0.16 -0.06  -0.12 -0.32  0.16 -0.05  -0.06  Age^2 
(0.04)  (0.03) (0.19)  (0.08) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.04)  (0.06) 
0.03  0.01 0.04  0.03 0.02  0.01 0.04  0.02  Superior Studies
(0.00)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.00)  (0.00) 
0.02  0.00 0.02  0.01 0.01  0.00 0.02  0.01  Secondary 
Studies  (0.00)  (0.11) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.15) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Full time job  0.04  0.03 0.01  0.02 0.03  0.03 0.02  0.02 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
0.87  0.92 0.95  0.94 0.86  0.92 0.95  0.94  Previous Wage 
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Medium skill   0.02  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.07  0.03 0.04  0.04 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
High skill  0.06  0.04 0.03  0.04 0.03  0.01 0.01  0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Tenure (>48)  0.01 0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.02  0.13  0.04 
  (0.11)  (0.16) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.46)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) 
0.00 0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.12  0.04  Tenure (24-48) 
(0.47)  (0.15) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.30)  (0.03) (0.00)  (0.00) 
*Time dummies are included in the estimation. 
* The first row represents the estimated parameter and the second row its p-value 
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41.  Table 9: Likelihood ratio test and correlation coefficients 
  Spain Germany  Portugal  France 
Likelihood ratio test
23 19.38  44.96  149.36  83.59 
0.30 0.22  0.29  0.26 
*
00 u ε ρ  
(0.06) (0.42)  (0.19)  (0.32) 
0.04 0.26  0.14  0.41 
*
01 u ε ρ  
(0.40) (0.01)  (0.29)  (0.01) 
0.20  0.03 0.22 0.45 
*
10 u ε ρ  
(0.04) (0.34)  (0.14)  (0.00) 
0.06 0.08  -0.08  0.14 
*
11 u ε ρ  
(0.39) (0.44)  (0.46)  (0.30) 
0.03 0.07  -0.87  -0.07 
*
20 u ε ρ  
(0.31) (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.14) 
-0.04 -0.72  -0.90  -0.81 
*
21 u ε ρ  
(0.44) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
42.  Table 10: Wage penalties for involuntary job movers 
   Spain  Germany  Portugal France 
  Counterfactual       
Voluntary job movers -6.71%  -13.20%  -4.09%  -9.75%  Exogenous 
Switching  Stayers -7.51%  -19.92%  -5.90%  -9.27% 
Voluntary job movers -14.82% -18.74%  -16.58%  -25.16%  Endogenous 
















                                                 
23 The value of the chi-squared is 12.59 with a confidence level of 95% and 10.64 with a confidence level of 90% 
with 6 degrees of freedom.   32
43.  Table 11 Wage penalty for involuntary job movers by observed characteristics 
   Spain  Germany  Portugal  France 
Tenure in previous job  Counterfactual        
Tenure <24 months  Voluntary job movers  -14.28%  -13.68%  -13.53%  -23.45% 
 Stayers  -10.85%  -18.86%  1.49%  -10.51% 
Tenure 24-48 months  Voluntary job movers  -14.76%  -24.53%  -20.73%  -27.77% 
 Stayers  -10.36%  -28.83%  -13.41%  -16.44% 
Tenure >48 months  Voluntary job movers  -18.12%  -30.41%  -22.19%  -28.69% 
 Stayers  -7.81%  -28.42%  -15.22%  -9.52% 
Age Counterfactual        
25 years  Voluntary job movers  -13.12%  -18.90%  -14.39%  -23.12% 
 Stayers  -10.41%  -18.76%  -4.36%  -13.79% 
35 years  Voluntary job movers  -15.81%  -21.96%  -19.96%  -26.04% 
 Stayers  -9.57%  -23.08%  -2.33%  -9.63% 
45 years  Voluntary job movers  -16.89%  -20.08%  -19.42%  -26.43% 
 Stayers  -9.37%  -24.15%  -3.64%  -9.60% 
55 years  Voluntary job movers  -15.36%  -12.65%  -17.87%  -24.61% 
 Stayers  -12.57%  -22.00%  -6.14%  -12.72% 
Unemployment Duration  Counterfactual        
3 Months  Voluntary job movers  -11.38%  -19.04%  -16.18%  -23.92% 
 Stayers  -6.24%  -22.65%  -3.36%  -9.63% 
6 Months  Voluntary job movers  -15.15%  -19.82%  -15.57%  -27.17% 
 Stayers  -10.34%  -23.55%  -3.64%  -14.23% 
12 months  Voluntary job movers  -18.54%  -18.07%  -17.32%  -28.51% 
 Stayers  -14.97%  -21.53%  -4.53%  -14.00% 
18 months  Voluntary job movers  -19.65%  -14.19%  -19.65%  -24.96% 
 Stayers  -15.16%  -17.10%  -8.29%  -11.63% 
Studies Counterfactual        
Superior Studies  Voluntary job movers -16.55%  -25.72%  -28.70%  -29.57% 
 Stayers  -3.80%  -25.73%  -0.36%  -4.76% 
Secondary Studies  Voluntary job movers -17.90%  -14.12%  -19.21%  -26.87% 
 Stayers  -11.55%  -19.56%  -4.81%  -14.38% 
Primary Studies  Voluntary job movers  -13.56%  -23.21%  -14.92%  -21.64% 
 Stayers  -12.16%  -27.90%  -6.91%  -12.57% 
Previous Wage (quartiles)  Counterfactual        
Q25  Voluntary job movers  -14.22%  -14.71%  -18.32%  -26.09% 
 Stayers  -9.92%  -11.38%  0.78%  -15.45% 
Q50 Voluntary  job  movers  -13.96%  -20.50%  -14.65%  -29.92% 
 Stayers  -20.48%  -24.89%  -6.45%  -29.72% 
Q75  Voluntary job movers  -10.43%  -26.29%  -8.33%  -32.84% 
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44.   
45.  Table 12: Wage penalties for Involuntary job movers by type of contract 
   Spain  Germany  Portugal France 
  Counterfactual        
Previous Job=Full time           
Voluntary job movers  -3.75%  -2.45%  -6.30%  -35.92%  Permanent Contract-Full 
time job  Stayers -7.45%  -9.61%  -8.96%  -9.12% 
Voluntary job movers  -5.36%  -4.75%  -14.38%  -35.43%  Temporary Contract-Full 
time job  Stayers -9.59%  -15.49%  -8.48%  -12.49% 
Voluntary job movers  -8.46%  -10.78%  -11.78%  -41.55%  Part-time job 
Stayers -35.83% -25.37%  -29.50%  -26.41% 
Previous Job=Part time          
Voluntary job movers  -3.25%  16.63%  2.16%  -35.19%  Permanent Contract-Full 
time job  Stayers 8.80%  30.02%  0.53%  9.87% 
Voluntary job movers  -4.88%  13.89%  9.92%  -34.70%  Temporary Contract-Full 
time job  Stayers 6.29%  21.58%  2.16%  5.80% 
Voluntary job movers  -7.98%  6.72%  7.41%  -40.88%  Part-time 
Stayers -24.55% -7.41%  -22.15%  -23.09% 
 